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BOOK REVIEW:
THE CONSTITUTIONAL WORLD OF
HAROLD NORRIS
EDUCATION FOR POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY THROUGH
IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION AND THE
BILL OF RIGHTS
by Harold Norris; Detroit College of Law,
130 E. Elizabeth Street, Detroit, Michigan 48201; 1991,
Pp. 700, $20.00.
Reviewed by Robert A. Sedlert
I am very honored to have been asked by the Detroit College
of Law Review to do this review essay of Professor Norris'
book. I was well acquainted with Professor Norris' work and
career before I came to Wayne State University in 1977. In
the period from 1966 to 1977, when I was teaching at the
University of Kentucky, I was not only writing about consti-
tutional matters, but I was an active litigator in civil rights
and civil liberties cases, mostly as a volunteer lawyer for the
ACLU. To those of us who considered ourselves a part of
the struggle for the protection of civil rights and civil liberties
in this Nation, Harold Norris was known as a "front-line"
defender of those rights and liberties in Michigan, and I looked
forward to meeting him.
In the last fourteen years, I have come to know Harold
Norris very well both personally and professionally. He is a
wonderful human being, and he epitomizes all that is meant
by "living under a constitution." As United States Senator
Carl Levin states in his preface to the book, "Harold Norris
is one of those patriots who have devoted their lives in diverse
ways to [the Constitution's] safekeeping, and this book provides
t Professor of Law, Wayne State University. A.B., 1956; J.D., 1959, Uni-
versity of Pittsburgh.
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a sample of his life's effort to protect the U.S. Constitution
and to extend its guarantees to each of us."'
The book may best be described as a compendium of con-
stitutional insights and experience. Professor Norris presents
his views and the views of many others on a large number
of constitutional questions. At the same time, he creates a
historical record of the protection of civil rights and civil
liberties in Michigan, especially during the 1950's and the
1960's, when on the one hand, civil liberties were being threat-
ened from a number of quarters, and on the other hand, this
state and nation were moving in the direction of enacting laws
that would protect the civil rights of racial minorities, women,
and other victims of discrimination.
Perhaps the most distinctive contribution of the book in
terms of generating "new knowledge" is that part titled, Book
11: Some Views, Approaches, and Interpretations to Implement
the Michigan Constitution and Its Declaration of Rights. As
a delegate from Detroit to the Michigan Constitutional Con-
vention of 1961-62 and vice chairman of the Committee on
the Declaration of Rights, Suffrage and Elections, Professor
Norris was, as Michigan Congressman John Conyers, Jr. has
stated, "[a] principal architect of Michigan's Bill of Rights." '2
In this part of the book Professor Norris has collected the
major documents that were a part of the process leading to
the adoption of the Michigan Bill of Rights at the Constitutional
Convention, and has provided extensive commentary about how
the Michigan Bill of Rights came into being. This commentary
and the source documents will be very helpful to lawyers and
courts in cases involving the application of the provisions of
the Michigan Bill of Rights.'
There are many themes that Professor Norris develops
throughout the book, and it would be impossible to discuss
all of them in a review essay. I am going to discuss three
1. Carl Levin, Preface to HAROLD NORRIS, EDUCATION FOR POPULAR SOV-
EREIGNTY THROUGH IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS at
xv (1991) [hereinafter NORRIS].
2. Id. at 579 (citing 124 CONG. REC. 579 (daily ed. July 19, 1978) (statement
of Rep. Conyers)).
3. The book also contains a large number of photographs, newspaper articles,
editorials, letters, and other materials covering some 30-plus years, which are a
treasure in themselves.
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themes that are of particular interest to me: (1) the meaning
of "education for popular sovereignty;" (2) the function of
constitutional limitations on governmental power in a demo-
cratic society; and (3) the role of the state constitution in the
supplemental protection of individual rights.
Probably the dominant theme of the book, as indicated by
the title, is Professor Norris' fervent belief in Education for
Popular Sovereignty. Professor Norris maintains that in the
final analysis, the American system of constitutional gover-
nance-with its emphasis on limitations on governmental power
and the constitutional protection of individual rights-depends
on the public's understanding of how a constitution operates
and the public's acceptance of the principle that the power of
the government should be limited in order to protect individual
rights. As Professor Norris states at the outset, "[t]here is no
substitute for individual responsibility in a self-governing nation
of self-governing individuals," 4 and, "[tihe Constitution and
the Bill of Rights place a heavy and continuing responsibility
on citizens in the American Experiment in popular sover-
eignty. "I And it is the individual citizen-not merely the lawyer,
or public official, or constitutional scholar-toward whom this
book is primarily directed. Professor Norris concludes his in-
troduction to the book by noting simply that: "[i]t is the
purpose of this collection to modestly stimulate more inquiry
about, and understanding of, some of the main principles or
ideas of our Constitution. We should try to make our founding
document even more rooted in our hearts, minds, and conduct
as citizens." ' 6
Throughout his long and distinguished career, Professor Nor-
ris has tried to "popularize the Constitution," to convey its
meaning to ordinary citizens, and above all, to "[m]ove younger
people to assume greater responsibility to defend and extend
the Bill of Rights. ' 7 The book contains two excerpts from
one of his efforts directed toward younger people for which
I may modestly claim "originating credit."
4. NoRIus, supra note 1, at iii.
5. Id. at v.
6. Id. at xxvii.
7. Id. at 649.
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Sometime during 1985, when I was chairperson of the Con-
stitutional Law Committee of the Michigan State Bar, I pro-
posed to the Committee that we should designate 1987-88 as
the "Year of the Constitution." This period would see the
coincidence of both the bicentennial of the United States Con-
stitution and the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Michigan Con-
stitution of 1963, and I proposed that the Committee undertake
a number of projects to commemorate these events. One of
the projects that I proposed we sponsor was the preparation
of a sourcebook on the United States and Michigan consti-
tutions for use by high school teachers and students in Mi-
chigan. The proposal was enthusiastically approved by the
Committee. In my mind, however, the success of the proposal
was linked to obtaining a particular author for the sourcebook,
which, of course, was Harold Norris. I knew that Professor
Norris was very much concerned about the failure of the
American educational system to put enough emphasis on the
Constitution and Bill of Rights in the school curriculum,8 and
I hoped that he would be able to put some other things aside
and make the enormous commitment in time and effort that
it would take to complete the project during the "Year of the
Constitution." Without a moment's hesitation, he agreed to
do so.
This work is titled Ideas in the Constitution: The Constitution
as a Living Document, and subtitled, A Discussion Guide for
High School Students to Encourage Understanding of Our
Nation's Founding Document.9 The two excerpts contained in
the book are Some Principles of the Constitution: A Talk
About the Main Ideas,10 and Looking Forward: Some Con-
stitutional Problems and Challenges." In the first excerpt,
Professor Norris challenges the students to relate the guarantees
8. Id. at 31-62 (citing Harold Norris, Education for Popular Sovereignty: A
Bicentennial View of the Purpose of Education, 1988 DET. C.L. REv. 897).
9. The book is summarized in Constitution Comes Alive in New Lesson
Guide, MICH. B.J., July 1989, at 594. "The book contains well-targeted reading
and discussion units, each featuring specific and stimulating questions, analyses and
other materials. The book can be used in separate, self contained sections or as
a comprehensive lesson plan, depending upon time available." See also, Norris,
supra note 1, at 677.
10. NoRsS, supra note 1, at 63-79.
11. Id. at 391-96.
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of the Bill of Rights to moral values inherent in the concept
of political freedom. As he states:
Political freedom is a moral concept. We believe political freedom
is congenial to human spirituality, human survival, human reason,
and human growth. It urges all to recognize the morality of our
constitutional arrangement of power and rights. We best promote
the interest of all majorities and all minorities by a democratic
state and constitution .... Our constitutional arrangement has given
us the best chance of continuing the personal and national effort
to achieve our national purpose-to constitute ourselves as a self-
governing nation of self-governing individuals. 2
In the second excerpt, Professor Norris asks the younger
generation to think about "matters for constitutional concern."
These include, The Military-Industrial Complex and the Impact
of Continuous Tension and War, The Declaration of War in
an Age of Nuclear Weapons, The Significance of the Authority
of Non-Governmental Organizations over the Civil Liberties
and Rights of the American People, The Need for Recognizing
Economic Rights as Well as Political Rights in the Constitution,
Shall a Federal Constitutional Convention Be Convened? and
Is There Not the Need for the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA)
in the Constitution? He reminds the students that while the
Bicentennial is a time of celebration and commemoration, "[it
is also a time to take inventory, to take a long look backward
and forwards." 3
Because of the wonderful sourcebook that Professor Norris
has prepared, high school students in Michigan will be in a
much better position to think about these questions and to
understand the meaning of our system of constitutional gov-
ernance. As the Detroit News stated, in an editorial built around
the publication of the sourcebook, "[o]ther anniversaries can
be noted, but for the Constitution to work, its ideas need to
be constantly renewed. ' 1 4 The sourcebook is another example
of Professor Norris' strong commitment to "popularizing the
Constitution," and reflects most clearly the dominant theme
of the present book, Education for Popular Sovereignty.
12. Id. at 78.
13. Id. at 391.
14. Id. at 679 (citing Teaching the Constitution, DETROIT NEWS, Sept. 26,
1989, at 10A).
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A second important theme in the book is the function of
constitutional limitations on governmental power in a demo-
cratic society. There is no "tension" between democratic gov-
ernment and constitutional limitations on the exercise of
governmental power. Quite to the contrary, Professor Norris
emphasizes that the Constitution limits the power of government
in order to protect the sovereign power of the American people
to be a self-governing community of self-governing individuals.
As he states:
All these rights, particularly the first eight amendments say to
government, look we have reserved power to ourselves as part of
our ruling power and we have the right of speech, we have the
right to be free from unreasonable search and seizures, we have
the right not to be compelled to give testimony against ourselves,
we have the right to a fair trial, the right to counsel. In short we
have reserved to ourselves the right to have rights. We have reserved
these rights to ourselves to protect our political freedom, our
paramount principle, our power to be a self-governing community
of self-governing individuals.'"
Professor Norris goes on to say that the same sovereign
power of the people that established governmental institutions
and gave them the power to govern also imposed limitations
on the exercise of that power. The design of the Constitution,
says Professor Norris, is that at the base of all our governmental
institutions is the sovereign power of the people. And, "[firom
this sovereign power flows delegation, separation, limitation,
and reservation. 1 16 He further states that: "This conception,
this design of the Constitution, imposes a comprehensive and
pervasive duty of vigilance on the part of the citizenry to see
that all government, is, indeed, limited, is indeed watched, is
indeed toeing the constitutional mark. Eternal vigilance is the
price of the Bill of Rights."' 7
Like Professor Norris, I believe that the relationship between
electorally accountable democracy and limitations on the ex-
ercise of governmental power in order to protect individual
rights is fundamental to an understanding of the system of
15. NoRRs, supra note 1, at 71 (emphasis added).
16. Id. at 336.
17. Id.
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constitutional governance established by the Constitution. It is
my submission, developed more fully elsewhere,"8 that the over-
riding principle in the structure of constitutional governance
established by the Constitution is the principle of limitation
on governmental power to protect individual rights. Electorally
accountable democracy is a very important principle in our
structure of constitutional governance in that the Constitution
directed that those who hold the reins of federal legislative
and executive power be electorally accountable. But the same
structure also makes it abundantly clear that the framers were
not willing to put their faith in electorally accountable de-
mocracy alone to prevent abuses of governmental power. So,
in the same Constitution, and most particularly in the Bill of
Rights, 9 they imposed substantial and sweeping limitations on
the power of the federal government, designed to protect in-
dividual rights.
The message that the framers were trying to convey to the
institutions of government established by the Constitution is
very clear:
We believe in representative democracy, and since we must have
a government, that government should be electorally accountable.
But we are fearful of government. We are concerned about abuse
of governmental power. There are certain things that we don't
want any government, no matter how electorally accountable, to
be able to do. Above all we want to protect certain individual
rights-fundamental rights, if you will-from any governmental
interference. So, in this Constitution, reflecting the structure of
constitutional governance that we have established, we have placed
numerous and often sweeping limitations on governmental power. 20
In any event, as Professor Norris emphasizes, limitations on
governmental power in our constitutional system are necessary
to protect the sovereign power of the American people to be
18. Robert A. Sedler, The Legitimacy Debate in Constitutional Adjudication:
An Assessment and a Different Perspective, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 93 (1983) [hereinafter
Sedler, The Legitimacy Debate].
19. The Bill of Rights is properly considered a part of the structure of
constitutional governance established by the original Constitution, because it was
promulgated "[p]ractically contemporaneous with the adoption of the original."
The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 67 (1873).
20. See Sedler, The Legitimacy Debate, supra note 18, at 125.
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a self-governing community of self-governing individuals. Not
surprisingly, Professor Norris sees the First Amendment as the
most important limitation on governmental power designed to
protect the right of the American people to self-governance.
As he cogently states:
The First Amendment is your right to self-government. The First
Amendment is, as Professor Alexander Meiklejohn used to say,
what democracy thinks with. The First Amendment provides the
means with which democracy corrects error; it is a self-correcting
mechanism. It promotes national security and peaceful change be-
cause error can be found and corrected. 21
Professor Norris' discussion of the relationship between the
First Amendment and democratic government demonstrates
what I have referred to as the dissent and social change function
of the First Amendment. As I have explained this function:
First, and from the political perspective the most important, is
what I call the freedom to dissent and work for social change.
Utilizing the guarantees of expression, assembly and petition in
their fullest sense, individuals and groups have the right to dissent
from the policies pursued by the government: They have the right
to try to change those policies and through the democratic process
to try to obtain the reins of governmental power for themselves.
In short, the First Amendment guarantees the right of peaceful
revolution, and the exercise of this right may not be subject to
inhibition and repression by those presently possessing governmental
power. 22
In elaborating on what I have called the dissent and social
change function of the First Amendment, Professor Norris
discusses the "role of dissenting minorities throughout our
history." ' 23 It was the "dissenting minorities," as Professor
Norris puts it, who:
(1) [djissented from the law of the land, started the movement for
the abolition of slavery, and produced the Thirteenth, Fourteenth,
and Fifteenth Amendments; (2) ... dissented from legal discrim-
21. NoRRms, supra note 1, at 75.
22. Robert A. Sedler, Review, The First Amendment in Theory and Practice,
80 YALE L.J. 1070 (1971) (reviewing T. EMERsoN, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF
EXPRESSION (1970)).
23. NoRRs, supra note 1, at 107.
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ination on account of sex, started the Women's Suffrage Movement,
and produced the Nineteenth Amendment granting women the right
to vote; (3) ... protested segregation of Black people and the
violation of the right of Black people to vote in the South, [which]
brought about the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and 1965 and an
amendment outlawing the poll tax; and (4) ... urged recognition
of a fundamental right to form, join and assist a labor union.2 4
On the other hand, when dissent is discouraged or repressed,
there is greater danger that the government will pursue policies
that turn out to be unsound and harmful to the Nation.
Professor Norris, myself, and many other Americans believe
that the Vietnam War was a disaster and caused grave harm
to this Nation both at home and abroad. Professor Norris
emphasizes that the Constitution, which reposes in the Congress
the power to declare war, contemplates full public debate on
the question: "It is the theory of the Constitution that Kings
and Presidents can do wrong and even if Presidents may be
right, they cannot wage war successfully unless there is public
support and broad consensus. Principle and pragmatism do
not favor Presidential preemption of Congress's power to de-
clare war." 25
Professor Norris maintains that the "legacy of McCarthyism"
stifled debate over the United States' involvement in the Viet-
nam War. "McCarthyism" 2 6 was "[p]rincipally a pervasive
repression of the civil liberties of persons in trade unions,
teacher and lawyer groups, writers, actors, activists of all sorts
by linking such individuals with 'subversion and commu-
nism.' ' 27 The effect of "McCarthyism," according to Professor
Norris, was that "[a] whole generation was intimidated. ' 28
Professor Norris goes on to say that: "I believe it can be
argued that without McCarthyism there could not have been
a Viet Nam. Many of those who disagreed with the Tonkin
Resolution and the Viet Nam War did not openly do so because
24. Id. at 107-08.
25. Id. at 95.
26. Named after the Wisconsin senator who, during the period roughly from
1946-1953, attacked political liberals as "communists" or "communist sympath-
izers," and accused them of being disloyal to the United States.
27. NoRRIs, supra note 1, at 655.
28. Id. at 98.
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they feared McCarthyite attacks upon themselves and concom-
itant loss of income and reputation.''29
However, once the Nation became enmeshed in the Vietnam
War, the dissent and social change function of the First Amend-
ment underwent a revival. Never before had there been so
much opposition to a war in which the nation was engaged.
There were massive protests and demonstrations, and a demand
for an end to the war and the draft that fueled it.3° The
government's efforts to repress anti-war protest by criminal
prosecutions of protestors and the like foundered on the rock
of the First Amendment, as the courts, with few exceptions,
upheld their First Amendment claims. 3' The protests persisted,
and succeeded in their objectives. In 1972, Congress abolished
the draft, and in January, 1973, the United States began pulling
out of Vietnam. The success of public opposition to the Vietnam
War demonstrates the operation of the dissent and social func-
tion of the First Amendment and can furnish another example
of how "dissenting minorities" produced a fundamental change
in governmental policy.
It is highly significant, in my view, that when President
Bush sought to employ military force against Iraq in the Gulf
War, he felt it necessary to assure the American people that
it would not be "another Vietnam." Even more significantly,
he recognized Professor Norris' point that the President "can-
not wage war successfully unless there is public support and
broad consensus." 3 2 There was a full debate in the Congress
over the use of military force against Iraq, and Congress gave
its approval. Regardless of whether or not one agrees with the
29. Id.
30. See Robert A. Sedler, Review, The Draft: A Handbook of Facts and
Alternatives, 57 Ky. L.J. 302, 311-12 (1969) (discussing the relationship between
the military draft and the ability of the President to involve the nation in the
Vietnam war).
31. See e.g., United States v. Spock, 416 F.2d 165 (1st Cir. 1969), where the
court reversed the convictions of a number of prominent anti-war activists who
were charged with conspiracy to assist draftees to avoid military service. All of
the activity of the defendants relied on by the government to establish the "con-
spiracy" consisted of acts of expression. As the court noted, "Inseparable from
the question of the sufficiency of the evidence to convict are the rights of the
defendants, and others, under the First Amendment." Id. at 169.
32. NoRRIs, supra note 1, at 95.
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decision to use military force against Iraq, it was a decision
arrived at only after full public debate, and a decision that
had strong public support.
It is in this respect that the circumstances leading to American
military involvement in Iraq supports Professor Norris' thesis
of the First Amendment as protecting the right of the American
people to self-governance. This is true of all the constitutional
limitations on governmental power designed to protect indi-
vidual rights, and it is this theme that Professor Norris develops
so effectively in his book.
The third theme in the book that I want to discuss is the
role of the state constitution in the supplemental protection
of individual rights. As I have discussed more fully elsewhere,33
in practice the function of the state constitution is to provide
additional protection to individual rights, beyond that which
is provided by the federal Constitution. When Professor Norris
authored the Michigan Bill of Rights at the Constitutional
Convention, it was with the view of expanding constitutional
protection of individual rights in Michigan by strengthening
the existing provisions of the Michigan Bill of Rights. As he
put it at the time: "[T]he Bill of Rights is what America is
all about. The United States, including Michigan, to be true
to itself, must close the gap between the principles and practices
of civil liberty, for a nation today is judged by the status of
the civil liberties of its citizens. ' 34
In his capacity as vice chairman of the Committee on Dec-
laration of Rights, Suffrage and Elections, Professor Norris
was able to exercise an enormous influence over the devel-
opment of Michigan's Bill of Rights in the 1963 Constitution. 35
Specifically, he drafted the following provisions: (1) the anti-
discrimination clause of Article I, Section 2, which prohibits
the "denial of civil or political rights on the basis of religion,
race, color or national origin," and the companion imple-
menting clause, which directs the legislature to implement the
33. Robert A. Sedler, The State Constitution and the Supplemental Protection
of Individual Rights, 16 TOLEDO L. REV. 465 (1985).
34. NORIS, supra note 1, at 412 (citing Harold Norris, Constitutional Rights
Issues at the Michigan Constitutional Convention, THE DET. LEGAL CHOON., June
9, 1961).
35. The Michigan Bill of Rights is contained in Article I, "Declaration of
Rights," and includes 23 sections. MICH. CoNsT. art. I.
1991] 1411
Detroit College of Law Review
guarantees of this section "by appropriate legislation; ' '36 (2)
the expansion of the right of petition in Article I, Section 2
from "legislature" in the predecessor provision to "govern-
ment," so that, as he puts it, "petitions for redress of grievances
can be encouraged and directed to any unit of government;" 37
(3) the addition of the word "express" to the words "speak,
write, and publish" thus creating a "freedom of expression"
to protect all the new media and all the many art forms, and
the substitution of the word, "views," for "sentiments," in
Article I, Section 5's guarantee of freedom of speech and of
the press, which, as the Convention Comment notes, "seems
to have a sharper and specific meaning;" ' 38 (4) a new provision,
contained in Article I, Section 17, which creates a "right of
all individuals, firms, corporations and voluntary associations
to fair and just treatment in the course of legislative and
executive investigations and hearings. ' 39 According to Professor
Norris, this provision was intended to prevent against some
of the abuses that occurred in such investigations during the
"McCarthy era; ' 40 and (5) a guaranteed right of appeal in all
criminal cases, in Article I, Section 22.11
In addition, Professor Norris was a co-author of Article 5,
Section 29, which created a Civil Rights Commission with
constitutional status and investigative powers to prevent dis-
crimination in the enjoyment of the civil and political rights
referred to in Article I, Section 2, and such other rights created
"by law," including federal law.42 This is a very unusual
provision in a state constitution. In most states, civil rights
commissions do not enjoy constitutional status and are subject
to regulation by the legislature. The fact that the Michigan
Civil Rights Commission enjoys constitutional status is strong
evidence of Michigan's constitutional commitment to racial
equality .43
36. NORRIS, supra note 1, at 650.
37. Id.
38. MICH. CONST. art I, § 5, Convention Comment.
39. NORRIS, supra note 1, at 650.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 651.
43. See the discussion of the constitutional status of the Michigan Civil Rights
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Professor Norris was also instrumental in removing a pro-
vision of the previous constitution that had been adopted by
referendum in 1950, during the height of the "McCarthy era."
This provision defined "subversion" as "[a]dvocacy of any
act intended to overthrow the form of government of the
United States or the form of government of this state," made
subversion a criminal offense, and declared that the guarantees
of freedom of speech, press or assembly could not be a defense
to subversion. 44 Professor Norris says that this section was
"clearly a police state measure," and that its elimination was
"one of the most challenging problems I faced at the con-
vention." 45
Professor Norris is justifiably proud of his role as architect
of a number of important provisions of the Michigan Bill of
Rights. As he observes, "[o]n the whole, many believe that
the changes I wrote into Michigan's Constitution made Mi-
chigan's Bill of Rights more protective than that of any other
state in the country. '46
Perhaps the most important of the provisions of the Michigan
Bill of Rights that were drafted by Professor Norris, in terms
of its potential impact, is the anti-discrimination clause of
Article I, Section 2.47 Article I, Section 2 contains three separate
clauses: the general guarantee of equal protection, the anti-
discrimination clause, and the implementing provision. The anti-
discrimination clause provides that "[n]o person shall be denied
the enjoyment of his civil or political rights or be discriminated
against in the exercise thereof because of religion, race, color
or national origin." ' 4a The Convention Record notes that "[tihe
Commission in Beech Grove Inv. Co. v. Michigan Civil Rights Comm'n, 380 Mich.
405, 417-19, 157 N.W.2d 213 (1968). In that case, the court held that racial
discrimination in the sale of housing by private persons was a "civil right" within
the meaning of Article 1, § 2, and so was within the investigative and enforcement
jurisdiction of the Michigan Civil Rights Commission. Id.
44. See NORRIS, supra note 1, at 672 n.3 (setting forth the text of this provision).
It is clear today that that provision was void on its face and in violation of the
First Amendment. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
45. NORRIS, supra note 1, at 651.
46. Id.
47. MICH. CONST. art. I, § 2.
48. Id. When the clause first emerged from the Committee, it included "sex,"
and, if it had been adopted in that form, it would have constituted the Nation's
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principal, but not exclusive, areas of concern are equal op-
portunities in employment, education, housing, and public ac-
commodations." 49
In the book, Professor Norris sets out in detail all the events
leading to the adoption of the anti-discrimination clause and
includes the major documents that were part of this process.5 0
He also sets out the justification for the provision that he
advanced at the Convention:
The Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution prohibits Mi-
chigan or any other state from denying due process of law and
the equal protection of laws to any citizen. However, it is not yet
the declared policy of the State of Michigan to prohibit race and
religion as criterion for discrimination or segregation. The question
is pertinent; May not the articulation of a constitutional policy
against racial or religious discrimination or segregation be in keeping
with advancing Michigan in the cause of a free society in light of
the national and international realities of the twentieth century?
May not such a constitutional provision implement our national
purpose to evaluate all Americans on the basis of individual merit
so that every citizen shall have equal opportunity to make the best
contribution to the strength and freedom of Michigan and the
nation?"'
The anti-discrimination clause was unanimously adopted by
the Convention, and as the Michigan Supreme Court has ob-
served, referring to the Anti-Discrimination Clause and the
other "civil rights" provisions in the Michigan Constitution,
"[t]he capstone of Michigan public policy with respect to civil
rights is the 1963 Michigan Constitution. '5 2
first equal rights amendment. As stated at that time, "[t]he Committee, in recognition
of the modern doctrine of the equality of women, has also incorporated a guarantee
against discrimination on account of sex." Norris, supra note 1, at 435-36 (citing
Report of the Declaration of Rights Committee, No. 61, Jan. 19, 1962)). The
prohibition against discrimination on the basis of "sex" was deleted from the final
version. Professor Norris has told me that this was because of opposition from
the relatively few women delegates to the Convention, who feared that such a
prohibition would have invalidated the "special protections" purportedly provided
for women under Michigan law. What an ironic footnote to Michigan's constitutional
history!
49. NoRRIs, supra note I, at 436.
50. Id. at 423-46.
51. Id. at 415 (citing Harold Norris, Constitutional Rights Issues at the Michigan
Constitutional Convention, THE DET. LEGAL CHRON., June 9, 1961).
52. Beech Grove Inv. Co. v. Michigan Civil Rights Comm'n, 380 Mich. 405,
435, 157 N.W.2d 213, 222 (1968).
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The reason why the anti-discrimination clause may be so
important in Michigan is that it can be interpreted to provide
greater protection against racial discrimination than is provided
by the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. This
brings me to my own involvement with the anti-discrimination
clause. In November, 1985, the .residents of Dearborn, in a
referendum vote of 17,000 to 13,000, adopted an ordinance
that prohibited non-residents from using Dearborn's parks ex-
cept as guests of Dearborn residents. This ordinance was widely
perceived as being directed toward keeping blacks out of Dear-
born's parks. Two parks, Ford Woods in east Dearborn, ad-
jacent to Detroit, and Crowley in west Dearborn, adjacent to
Inkster, were extensively used by black residents of those cities
respectively. I was asked by the Michigan ACLU and the
Detroit Branch, NAACP, to prepare a constitutional challenge
to the ordinance, and agreed to do so. 3
I immediately concluded that a challenge to the ordinance
under the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause
would be unsuccessful. The United States Supreme Court has
interpreted the Equal Protection Clause as reaching only gov-
ernmental action undertaken with a racially discriminatory pur-
pose, 4 and there was no realistic way of showing that an
ordinance approved by 17,000 voters in a referendum was
adopted with a racially discriminatory purpose. However, it
was possible to construct a challenge to the ordinance under
the anti-discrimination clause of the Michigan Constitution.
We argued that the anti-discrimination clause was an inde-
pendent limitation on governmental action affecting racial mi-
norities, and that it provided greater protection against racial
discrimination than is provided by the more general guarantee
of equal protection in Article I, Section 2, and in the Fourteenth
Amendment. This meant, we argued, that the standard for a
constitutional violation under the anti-discrimination clause was
racially discriminatory effect rather than racially discriminatory
53. NAACP v. City of Dearborn, 173 Mich. App. 602 (1988), Iv. denied, 433
Mich. 906, 447 N.W.2d 751 (1989).
54. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). See generally Robert A.
Sedler, The Constitution and the Consequences of the Social History of Racism,
40 ARK. L. REv. 677, 687-96 (1987).
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purpose. Under this standard, a governmental action would be
unconstitutional if it had an effect because of race. Specifically,
we contended that since the foreseeable effect of the Dearborn
parks ordinance was to exclude Black residents of Detroit and
Inkster, who were "natural users" of Dearborn parks, from
those parks, and since there was no substantial justification
for the ordinance,5 it had an effect because of race for con-
stitutional purposes, and thus violated the anti-discrimination
clause.
Wayne Circuit Judge Marvin Stempien agreed with all our
arguments and held that the ordinance violated the anti-dis-
crimination clause with respect to Ford Woods and Crowley1 6
The Michigan Court of Appeals, in an opinion written by
Judge Myron Wahls, and joined in by Judges William Murphy
and John Gillis, affirmed Judge Stempien's decision in all
respects, and leave to appeal was denied by the Michigan
Supreme Court. 7 Thus, the Michigan Court of Appeals has
held that the standard for a constitutional violation under the
anti-discrimination clause is racially discriminatory effect. So
long as this holding stands-and I am optimistic that the
Michigan Supreme Court would agree with the holding of the
court of appeals if the question should come before it-the
Michigan Constitution, as a result of the anti-discrimination
clause that was drafted by Professor Norris, provides greater
protection against racial discrimination than is provided by the
United States Constitution.
The potential impact of the anti-discrimination clause on the
struggle for racial equality in Michigan illustrates most clearly
the function of a state constitution in providing additional
protection to individual rights, beyond that which is provided
by the federal Constitution. The other provisions of the Mi-
55. The undisputed evidence showed that the Dearborn parks were not ov-
erutilized, so that the only purpose for the ordinance could be a "naked, selfish
preference for Dearborn residents." NAACP, 173 Mich. App. at 610-15, 434 N.W.2d
at 448-50.
56. The judge also held that the ordinance was completely unenforceable as
to all the parks in the Dearborn system because the enforcement mechanism-
random demands by park rangers for resident identification by park users-con-
stituted an illegal search and seizure, in violation of the Michigan Constitution.
Id. at 618-19, 434 N.W.2d at 451.
57. Id. at 605, 434 N.W.2d at 445.
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chigan Bill of Rights, as well, may be used to provide such
additional protection. Of all the many contributions of Harold
Norris to the "constitutional life" of Michigan, his role as
the "architect of the Michigan Bill of Rights" may turn out
to be the most significant.
It is on this note that we may end our review of the
constitutional world of Harold Norris and our personal and
professional tribute to this very outstanding person. It surely
can be said that the constitutional world is a better place to
be because for a period of time Harold Norris has lived in
it.
